Week 5 Hurricane Katrina As A Predictable Surprise Discussion Help
Question Description
Respond by Day 5 to two colleagues by explaining the benefits of criminal justice organizations understanding the concept of predictable surprise.

Respond to Darrel as if you’re having a conversation with him. A few sentences and a question.
The convergence of race, police brutality, poverty, and an inadequate criminal justice system exploded in the intersection of Florence and Normandie. This explosion was the aftermath of a community that historically experienced systematic racism and repressive policing polices. South Central Los Angeles was a breeding ground of gangs, aggression, and repressed rage. The city was tense after the officers involved in the Rodney King case were acquitted. This combustible environment was ignited on April 29, 1992 and wasn’t subdued until May 4, 1992. The aftermath was six days of rioting,53 dead, 6,345 arrested, and over a billion dollars in damage. This predictable surprise was poorly planned, managed, and executed.
Crimerates in Los Angeles and in the US increased in the 1980s and 1990s. In1991, crime rates reached an apex, and some African-American leaders inLos Angeles were praising the mayor and chief of police for engineeringgang sweeps. (Katz, 2016). The gang sweeps were called Operation Hammerand manifested under the guise of a zero-tolerance approach to gangassociation. Operation Hammer was not done in conjunction with communitypolicing strategies. Most of the police officers involved didn’t workthe area, were not familiar with communal norms, didn’t know the youth,and casted a wide net that entangled any suspecting African-Americanyouth. (Katz, 2016).
Asa result of Operation Hammer thousands of adolescent African-Americanyouth were arrested, jailed for a day, and released. This intensifiedthe distrust between many in African-American communities and thepolice. The Rodney King trial commenced during a period of heightenedtension in the ghettos of Los Angles, CA. Many in the community warnedthat if the four officers accused of severely beating Rodney King wereacquitted there could be rioting. African-American leaders and policeofficers addressed the warnings and public concern in a dismissive tone.Politically framing the pre-acquittal tension as street peopleexpressing anti-establishment opposition was a substantialmiscalculation. Threats of anti-establishment expression and riots areaddressed two ways: diplomatic strategies and force. (Useem, 1997)
Forcestrategies are often used to stop the mobilization and expansion ofrioting and/or violence. It’s usually administered after diplomacy hasfailed. However, the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) and thealleged African-American leaders miscalculated the gravity of thesituation. The LAPD was at a disadvantage because most of the officersarresting and harassing the African-American youth during OperationHammer had no relationship or connection to the community. They wereviewed as an external force administering abusive and repressivetactics. The alleged African-American leaders were not consideredcommunity leaders by residents within the community. LA’s environmentprior to the Rodney King verdict was prime for disorder, violence, andrioting. The so-called power players advising the mayor and LAPD aboutthe nature of the situation were out of touch with the pulse of thecollective rage.
TheLAPD could’ve severely reduced the magnitude of the rioting, violence,deaths, and property damage, by employing proper planning andpreparation techniques. Instead of relying on alleged African-Americanleaders, the LAPD could’ve talked with influential people in variousSouth Central, Watts, West LA, and Compton neighborhoods to get a moreaccurate gauge of the tension and potential violence. By employing morecommunity-based policing strategies, the LAPD would’ve been betterprepared to respond to heightened situations. Proper planning andpreparation are essential to successfully establishing control,maintaining order, and confining disorder in a specified location.(Useem, 1997).
Therewere opportunities to address and contain the growing tension head on,but two LAPD chiefs listened to a councilman that warned against a showof force. (Useem, 1997). The destruction and loss of life resulting fromthe LA riots was a prime example of how a skilled criminal justiceorganization could’ve identified the probability of disorder, spoke withpeople influential in various communities, and had specialized unitsready to diffuse expanding disorder. Instead what was left was urbandecay and politicians and police officers associating blame. SouthCentral Los Angeles experienced an investment and rebuilding void afterthe riots. Although, the crime rates steadily decreased after the riots,the residents didn’t experience an increase in the quality of life. The1992 LA riots serves as a warning to criminal justice organizationsabout the importance of comm